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At the start of December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. He promised an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Not long after, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, striking sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President stated, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

This dichotomy highlights the core feature of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and ending wars—even as this fits with the nascent military strikes in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a senior U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson reinforced this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Mixed Signals

This shift is major, but analysts warn it is too soon to judge its results. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Apathy and Tensions

Differing from his predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable foray into African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy and Conditional Intervention

An analogous confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

Similar to Other Powers

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.